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COMPETING AIMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION

GEOFFREY

C.

HAZARD, JR.*

The following is the manuscript of a presentationgiven by Geoffrey C.
Hazard,Jr. in conjunction with the University of North Dakota Centennial
Academic Symposium on February 23, 1983. Professor Hazard graduated
from Swarthmore College and earned his law degree from Columbia
University. He has taught at Boalt Hall (Berkeley), the University of
Chicago, and Yale.

I. INTRODUCTION
We celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the
University of North Dakota. In doing so we should especially
celebrate the faith and generosity of those who founded the
university and those who continue to sustain it - the taxpayers and
other donors who have given of their own that this institution might
prosper. That kind of faith and generosity is particularly worthy of
appreciation in an era whose ethos is not only "me first" but also
"right now," with the motto of our time being "I want it right
now. "'
Whatever "it" might be, those who want it "right now" had
better stay away from universities. Those who found and maintain
universities get little in direct return for themselves; the direct
returns go to the students. And the returns are not realized "right
now" even for the students. The benefits of a university are
*Baker Professor of Law, Yale University.
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enjoyed by the next generation, but only years after the original
investment.
It therefore behooves us, in considering universities, to think
in the long term, difficult as that may be. It is especially
appropriate that we think in the long term when thinking of a
university law school. A university law school engages in education
in an art that the students will perform for a lifetime. It is not easy
to think, in any realm of endeavor, what we should do now with an
eye to consequences as many as forty years from now, but that is
the way we must try to think about professional education.
The task of long-range thinking is no less difficult when the
subject matter is law. It is true that there is an affinity between the
law of 1933, or even 1883, and the law of today, and it is probably
true that this affinity is greater than that between the medicine of
1933 and the medicine of today. Yet the affinity between the legal
past and the legal future can be a source of misdirection, leading us
to think that there is more continuity in the law than actually exists.
Just because we can cite a judicial opinion of a century ago in a
contemporary legal controversy does not imply that the language
does or should mean the same thing in the present context as it did
when uttered. Justice Holmes said in his lifetime that the law
remakes itself every twenty years or so; if that is true, these days the
law must remake itself every ten years or so, whether we realize it
or not. Hence, the educational task for law schools is in fact not
much different from the educational task of medical schools, whose
technical subject matter obviously revolutionizes itself every
decade.
The poet Addison said:
Books are the legacies that a great genius leaves to
mankind, which are delivered down from generation to
generation, as presents to the posterity of those who are as
yet unborn.
One might say that educational institutions, including law
schools, are the legacy of ordinary genius to those who are being
born into adult life. But what should that legacy be? As we lawyers
would put it, what should be the terms and conditions of the gift?
II. THE IDEAL LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
The question can be restated by asking, what is the ideal law
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school curriculum? When the question is put this way a standard
rejoinder is the impossibility of creating an ideal curriculum, or an
ideal anything. This counsel of conventional wisdom is of course in
a sense correct. Given the fallibilities of human material and the
limitations of material resources, we know we cannot construct the
ideal in the real world. Conventional wisdom also tells us that no
practical program has universal applicability. This counsel is also
of course in a sense correct. Given the variations in local need and
circumstance, we know that every real world structure cannot be
built from the same blueprint.
From these conventionalities, it follows that we should settle
for second best. That wisdom is not only conventional but
profound, for there is no enemy of change more relentless than the
counsel of perfection. But the predication that we must settle for
second best does not signify that we should contemplate the second
best in defining our aims. Actually achieving the second best is very
difficult. It requires great and continuing effort, especially in
matters of detail. It also requires that we contemplate the best; that
is, that we construct a conception of what we are trying to do even if
we know from experience that we will fall short of achieving it.
Otherwise, we will achieve not second best but second rate.
From this perspective, I believe it is possible to describe an
ideal law school curriculum. The reason I am confident of this
proposition is that such a curriculum already has been described.
Indeed, it has been described over and over again with tiresome
repetition in the last twenty years.1
The ideal law school curriculum includes eight elements. First,
conventional case law analysis beginning in the first semester and
continuing on a diminished basis throughout law school. The
purpose is to teach reading, critical analysis of reasoning, and
elementary legal synthesis - the putting together of two or three
decisions on the same subject.
Second, exploration in depth of basic legal ideas. Without
explaining the point, I will simply say that these ideas can be
subsumed under the headings of contracts, wrongs, and
procedures. The purpose is to explicate these fundamentals for
1. See generally E.
LAW SCHOOL
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LAiv SCHOOLS, Trainingfor the Public Professionsof the Law: 1971, 1971 A. AM. L. SCHS.; Cramton,
The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32J. LEGAL EDUC. 321 (1982); Cramton, Report of the Task Force
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their own sake and to make it possible for the student to discover
the elements of legal controversy in whatever form they may be
manifested.
Third, description in moderate to shallow depth of a wide
range of legal subject matter, such as constitutional law, taxation,
and zoning law. The purposes are to provide practice in
discovering the elements of legal controversy in various disguises,
to provide citations to relevant books, and to prevent later
embarrassment, for example, in an employment interview when
the student is asked whether he has ever heard of these subjects.
Fourth, practice in lawyer's writing, the purpose of which is
obvious. Fifth, practice in lawyer's argument, in various forms of
advocacy and negotiation. The purpose of this is also obvious.
Sixth, instruction in elementary facts about legal institutions,
such as where to find the clerk's office and the lavatories. The need
for this information is also obvious and the question is only why it
needs to be taught in law school. One answer may be that many
practitioners do not know these elementary facts. It is more
plausible, however, that these are the only facts which many
practitioners know, hence they are guarded as trade secrets.
Seventh, an understanding of the state of the art of various
social sciences, particularly economics, sociology, and political
science. An explanation of this would take more time than we have
on this occasion. I will only say that the Critical Legal Studies
movement, 2 now very energetic in some law schools, perhaps can
be better and more sympathetically understood if it is interpreted as
a response to the neglect of politics in the study of law.
Eighth, moral education, that is, the analysis of right and
wrong independent of the law's definition of right and wrong. This
also is a large topic for another occasion.
Most of these components of an ideal legal education appear
on many lists, often designated by different names. The
challenging problem is thus not to work out an ideal law school
curriculum, but to work out why it is so difficult to put the ideal
into practice. Put differently, we have reinvented the wheel many
times but now need to discover how to put it on the sledge.
III. COMPETING CONSTITUENCIES
Even if everyone agrees as to what legal education ought to be,
2. Gerson, Professorsfor the Revolution, NAT'L L.J., Aug 23, 1982, at 1, col. 2. The views of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies are now appearing in legal journals. See, e.g., Kennedy, Legal
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they certainly do not agree on the proportions for the components.
They probably also disagree as to the character of some of the
components, particularly the relationships between law and social
science and between law and morality. I believe that impasses in
the development of legal education are attributable to these
differences and to the implications they have for the various
constituencies involved in legal education. In a realist analysis of a
legal problem, one comes to understand the problem by searching
out the real conflicts of power and interest lying beneath the surface
controversy. The same approach may be useful in a consideration
of our present problems with legal education.
Looking at legal education in this perspective, we might
proceed through analysis of the relevant constituencies. By
constituencies, I mean simply the more or less identifiable groups
who have some special interest in the operation and survival of the
institution. In the case of a business corporation, for example, we
identify the constituencies as the stockholders, management,
employees, and the public. In the case of a local school district we
might identify the constituencies as the parents, the students, the
staff, and the taxpayers. Using the same approach to a law school,
we could identify the relevant constituencies as the faculty, the
students, the bar, the outside funding sources, and the public. It
will be apparent that this approach not only gives us the names and
numbers of the players in the competition, but also a place of
beginning to determine what the game is all about.
This approach of course requires some sensitivity and
forebearance. To say openly that there is conflict among
constituencies of an institution can have the effect of exacerbating
the conflict among them. Particularly is this true if identifying
conflict is simply a predicate for resorting to the technique of
conflict resolution that has become only too prevalent in our era,
the use of legal compulsion. I come not to legislate problems of
legal education but to/explicate them.
A.

THE PUBLIC

I suggest we consider these constituencies in reverse order
from that just specified, that is, beginning with the public. In some
sense, there is no such thing as the public. The public is simply
everyone left over after others have been identified as specific
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy. 32.J. LG;AI Einc. 591 (1982): Klarc.
Curriculum in the 1980's: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336 (1982).
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constituent groups. And yet the public does exist in the sense that
there is general citizenry which has an idea, vaguely defined and
loosely held, of what an institution is supposed to be. I doubt very
much that a public opinion poll would yield very precise ideas
about a law school. But such a poll would yield something,
particularly if it were a probing conversation instead of a simple
questionnaire. In any case, I believe that the average citizen could
make some relevant distinctions.
For example, I am sure that the general public of this state
would make some important distinctions between the aims of this
law school and the aims of say, Harvard Law Schoo 3 or the law
school at the University of Minnesota. One distinction that citizens
of this state would make is that the law school at the University of
North Dakota is in some proprietary sense "their" law school. By
this they would mean, if pressed to explain, that the school is
supposed to serve the interests of this state in some specific sense. It
should provide education for students from this state who want to
go to law school and who have the ability to complete the
curriculum. The school should graduate lawyers in sufficient
numbers and of sufficient competence and inclination to meet the
needs of the state in the years ahead.
The responsibility thus imputed to the school is underscored
by the fact that the school is a part of a public university. In this
country, public universities are constituted not merely to meet a
supposed need of the younger generation. We think of grade school
and high school in those terms, that is, as a right of each individual,
and we have a similar attitude toward undergraduate collegiate
education, though with more ambivalence. But when we get to
graduate and professional education, the notion of education of
right is clearly no longer operative. There is some concept of quid
pro quo, even if both the quid and the quo are hard to define.
In this regard, we might compare the public's expectations for
places like the University of Minnesota and Harvard. I suspect that
the Minnesota public's conception for the law school in that state is
much the same as in North Dakota, with the difference that
Minnesota is a much more metropolitan and commercial
community. The public there is more heterogeneous, more distant,
necessarily less focused in its collective wants. Accordingly, its law
school can indulge in a wider variety of aims. For example, the
3. "Harvard Law School" is a term of art meaning any one of a number of law schools generally

included in lists of schools nationally regarded as the most prestigious. See Van Alstyn, Ranking the
Law Schools: The Reality ofIllusion?, 1982 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCHJ. 649.
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Minnesota law school perhaps can accept a higher percentage of
students from out-of-state, because the need to supply the state with
lawyers weighs more heavily than that of providing opportunity for
local students to go to law school. Also, variations in the curriculum
that might be regarded as exotic at the University of North Dakota
might be regarded with acceptance at the University of Minnesota.
When we extend the comparison to the elite law schools, if I
may use that term, the differences in public expectation are greater.
I suppose that the average citizen of a midwestern state regards
those schools with some mixture of respect, disdain, and possibly
resentment. Respect, because the elite institutions are recognized
as great universities, whatever might be the exact meaning of that
term. Disdain, because the physical, social, and economic distance
is great between the average citizen and the privileged few who are
at Harvard Law School, if indeed it is supposed that there are
actually real people at such an institution. Resentment, because the
elite universities are perceived to be academies for the wealthy, the
influential, and possibly the brilliant, in contrast to the good, the
true, and the diligent. But as long as those elite institutions can
avoid being cradles of upper class radicalism, or at least keep that
kind of radicalism on the East Coast where it belongs, they can be
regarded by the public as more or less irrelevant.
Yet the elite institutions are relevant, even to the average
citizen. The general public shares the hope that the education at the
state university will be good enough that its graduates can compete
with those who had the money and other advantages that permitted
them to go to Harvard. The public constituency for the state
university law school thus is at least somewhat ambivalent in its
attitude. Consistent with the American tradition of availability of
opportunity, the public university law school should afford the
average good resident student an opportunity for education in a
place other than an institution that only the privileged can attend.
Consistent with the American tradition of equality of opportunity,
that education should be fundamentally as good as the education
available to the privileged, which means an education something
like that in the far away places attended by the privileged. This
ambivalence is not simply confused thinking. It reflects that our
citizenry, in its aspirations for higher education as in many other of
its aspirations, has great difficulty giving concrete meaning to the
ideal of equality of opportunity. For that reason, a public university
law school has more leeway to pursue a program like the elite law
schools than on the surface might appear.
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THE LEGISLATURE

We come then to a second type of constituency, the outside
funding sources. In a public university, of course, this means
primarily the state legislature. The state legislature is especially
significant in relation to the law school of a public university. This
is because state legislatures have a substantial fraction of lawyers in
their membership. Even though that ratio declined over the last 30
years or so, if we take account of the influentials in the legislature,
and take account also of the third house consisting of the lobbyists,
the legal profession has heavy weight in the legislature. As a
consequence, the legislature has a special interest in the law school,
and one might say peculiar knowledge about its affairs. This
interest and knowledge is most sharply focused where, as in this
state, there is only one state law school and only one law school in
the state.
What does the legislature want the law school to be? To a large
extent, its expectations are the same as those of the general public.
This should not be surprising, because legislators who do not
generally share public expectations do not generally remain
legislators. But the legislature has some special concerns of its own.
Its chief concern is expense. The perennial concern is the cost of
staff, particularly faculty: how many positions are there and what is
the salary structure? The legislature generally sees this problem in a
narrowly local comparative framework: how do the salaries and
fringes of law school faculty compare with other university faculty,
and with other professionals on the state payroll, such as the staff in
the attorney general's office?
The cost side of legal education in a public university is thus
rigidly controlled by the state legislature. At the same time, benefit
tends to be measured in very conventional terms. Observers of the
public budgetary process describe this phenomenon as
incrementalism. It means that the agency will do best with the
legislature if it does the same thing as last year and therefore asks
for the same appropriation plus an inflation factor. This budgetary
method is sometimes frustrating from the legislative perspective,
because change in programs becomes impossible except by small
degrees and then only over long periods of time or upon the
occasion of a crisis. But the procedure is equally frustrating from
the viewpoint of the agency, in this case the law school. Everyone
knows that the surest course is to do the same thing as last year, and
the most dangerous is to do something discernably different. When
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enough years go by under this kind of discipline, internal interests
in the department become so entrenched as to defy consideration of
new approaches, let alone their implementation. For example, it
would be almost unthinkable to formulate and execute a plan
whereby twenty-five percent of the present salary dollars might be
converted into an equivalent budgetary amount for teaching
assistants and clinical faculty, or converted into building a really
sophisticated videotape library. I do not say that these are desirable
transformations, but only that they entail unjustifiable risks if
proposed in the typical legislative budgetary process.
I wonder whiether state legislatures comprehend how much
their procedures and attitudes toward finance affect the atmosphere
of a public university. The institution is supposed to be preparing
young people for a lifetime in competition with others from the
national community, but the legislature focuses on the variance of
next year's salaries from this year and from the salary level in the
state highway department. Yet if the facts were fully faced, the
situation is not much different in a private university, except that
the budget overseer is not the legislature but the provost or
financial vice-president. In either case, incrementalism dominates
and program change is proportionately difficult.
One lesson to be drawn is that a law school, or any university
department for that matter, usually has to move by small
increments if it is to move at all. Those who advocate change, bless
them, should recognize how hard even a willing dean will find the
task of bringing it off. At the same time, it should be appreciated by
other constituencies of the school, particularly alumni, that the
school will gain great advantage from having some "free" money,
i.e., money not tied directly into the regular budget. Even in small
amounts, money of that character can provide what money always
provides, namely freedom. And it will be a wise although
uncommon legislature or provost that can recognize its own
disability, and therefore leave the "free" money outside the regular
budget at least for a few years.
No doubt I have missed nuances in the relationship that
actually exists between this law school and its legislature. There are
many variations in this relationship, running from continuing
esteem to civil war. The fact remains, however, that this
relationship is very important in determining the curriculum of a
public law school. It is widely recognized that process is an
important determinant of outcome, and particularly that the
budgetary process is an important determination of program
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outcome. I believe this relationship helps explain the inertia in law
school curricula, particularly but not exclusively those in public
university law schools, just as it explains inertia in the Defense
Department. However, the very identification of this relationship is
a step in transforming it, for the process of criticism itself changes
prior behaviorial process. And we need not go the whole way to
zero-base budgeting to see that it would be desirable for the
legislature, or the provost's office, once in a while to ask not only,
"How much does it cost?", but "What are we trying to do?"
I will not say much about other funding sources, because in
most public institutions they are of distinctly subordinate
importance. For reasons already indicated, however, even small
independent resources procure large measures of program initiative
and opportunities for distinction. I would hope that alumni of
public universities could come to appreciate this as much as their
private university counterparts.
C. THE BAR

We come next to the alumni and the bar. The legal profession
is inevitably an influential constituent of a law school. Particularly
is this so when the law school is the only one in the state. For one
thing, in such a situation the bar as a group coincides to a large
extent with alumni as a group. Everyone knows that alumni are
important, especially the alumni themselves. They continually
monitor the school and contribute to the fluid consensus as to how
it is doing. The question uppermost in the minds of the alumni, of
course, is whether the place is still as good as it used to be when old
Professor Fudd scared hell out of the first year students. The
answer to this question, of course, is that the school is not what it
used to be, and never was. But allowing for the deterioration that
nostalgic eyes always detect, the assessment can shift upward or
downward over time.
The level at which this assessment stands at any given time is
of great importance. If there is a tradition of substantial gift-giving,
as there is in many law schools, the state of opinion will register on
the barometer of donations. But the constituency in the legal
profession includes not only lawyers who are alumni, but also
lawyers who are not. The category of alumni thus merges into the
category of the bar, the difference being that alumni define their
own legal education in a positive way, while members of the bar do
not necessarily do so.
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The influence of the bar on legal education is very great,
although the character and impetus of that influence is often
misperceived by legal academics. The most obvious influence of the
bar is upon accreditation. Here, the standard interpretation by law
faculty is that the bar is a bunch of philistines. I would be the last to
say that there are no philistines in the bar, having met a number of
them myself. Furthermore, the specific accreditation proposals
emanating from the bar often are superficial and mechanical.
Having said that, however, I believe it is also true that the concerns
that animate these proposals have a lot more basis than legal
academia is willing to admit.
Take the law of procedure, for example. The bar wants to
know why some law school graduates do not know how to make an
evidentiary objection. This seems to me a legitimate objection,
both because many law school graduates in fact do not know how to
do this and because all of them should know how to do it. Of
course, it is a long way from that point to requiring every law
student to take a semester course in trial advocacy. However, the
exaggerated form of the remedy should not obscure the fact that the
remedial proposal was instigated by a real deficiency.
Take commercial law. Shouldn't every law school graduate
know the basic difference between assignability and negotiability? I
do not say every student should therefore be required to take a
course in commercial law, but on the other hand it doesn't take a
full blown course in commercial law to teach the idea of
negotiability.
These items would appear in a detailed elaboration of the ideal
law school curriculum that we have postulated. There are many
more such items. However, the bar's list is not infinitely long.
Indeed, I think the list would be shorter if it were conceded at the
outset that such a list could be compiled. That concession,
however, will not be made by many legal academics, especially at
some of the elite law schools. The result will be continued pressure
from the bar, which will continue to try in a clumsy and frustrated
way to get the law schools to fulfill their promise of professional
education.
In this regard, it is important to consider another aspect of the
influence of the bar on legal education. This is the appraisal of law
schools that members of the bar disseminate to prospective students
and new law school graduates. The interaction between the bar and
the students has an importance often greatly underestimated,
particularly by faculty. The interaction occurs not only in the
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placement process but in many other channels. Lawyers and law
students have direct contacts in such activities as moot court and
practice trials, in which practitioners assume an immediate role of
professional mentor and model. Lawyers have direct influence,
whether or not well informed, in advising students what courses are
important and on the ways to open and develop one's professional
career. More fundamentally, the bar establishes the operative
standards of skill, acuity, diligence and autonomy in the profession
for which students are preparing themselves. Quite apart from the
bar's conventional pieties on these subjects, it is against these
standards that the students will measure themselves and the faculty
will teach. I sometimes wonder whether the bar understands how
influential it is on law school education, not so much by precept which is regarded with justified skepticism - but by example,
which is observed more closely than lawyers might imagine.
In this vein I have to say that I get quite impatient with
members of the bar who tell me what I as a faculty member should
teach the students, as though I am unaware of my responsibility in
this regard. I wonder whether they understand how much they
teach the students - in what they do, what they say, and what they
do not say. The students all the time are watching and listening, as
are the faculty, who have explanations for what it all means.
There are members of the constituency in the bar who provide
strong positive support for a sensible program in a law school. They
understand that legal education is not merely to provide navigation
in the first year of apprenticeship but to inform for a lifetime of
continuous adaptation and learning. They know that the forms of
actions and law office forms are merely that, forms in which
substance must be poured not slavishly but with intelligence and
discrimination and therefore with fundamental understanding.
They know the law recreates itself every ten years, and therefore
that to study only what the law is results in studying only what the
law was. They know that disciplined imagination is a major
component of successful law practice, and therefore that a good
legal education nurtures imagination as well as inculcates
discipline. And those members of the bar who understand these
things, and act and speak accordingly, contribute much to a law
school's concept of itself.
Yet the bar inevitably has interests that move in an opposite
direction. Particularly is this true of a bar whose practice is
conducted primarily in relatively small firms and solo practices. As
an analytic statement, that is not intended as an invidious
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comparison. The fact remains that small organizations, whether in
law or any other discipline, shape their operations around
immediate necessities much more than do large organizations.
They are too busy to plan, too busy to develop systems, too busy to
train, too busy to review and redirect the work of their junior
members except in response to crisis. Their technical needs are felt
now, not tomorrow or next year. These needs translate into
demands of similarly immediate dimension. The small firm lawyer
usually wants graduates who can draft a pleading, a deed, a will, an
application for a zoning variance, a set of corporate bylaws - now.
And that want is translated into student expectation through the
media of exchange referred to earlier.
It is surely not to the student's long-range interest to define his
or her educational expectations in terms of these immediate
expectations, even though it surely appears in his short-range
interest to do so. Yet in the interest of the students a law school
program cannot ignore the short-range perspective. Nor can this
perspective be ignored if the attention of the students is to be
maintained, particularly as they approach the bar in their third
year. Having acknowledged that point, however, the main point
should be made clear: it will be a disservice to the students of today
and the bar of tomorrow if the longer-range perspective of legal
education is not kept foremost in mind. In the long run, after all, it
will be more important to understand the fundamentals of
administrative procedure, for example, than to know exactly where
to file the zoning petition. The clerk knows where to file the
petition, and the young lawyer should be careful to ask him.
D.

THE STUDENTS

We come, then, to the students. Frankly, I am not sure that
they should be considered a constituency, as distinct from a
medium through which other constituencies operate to shape the
life of a law school. No doubt the attitudes and ambitions of law
students in the elite law schools are more volatile than those of
students who study closer to the ground. Hence, my observation of
the student constituency over the last several years, made while
teaching in an elite school, may be misinformed when it comes to
the student populations elsewhere. My guess is, however, that the
fluctuations in student attitude at the elite schools are greater only
in magnitude and not in frequency than the fluctuations elsewhere.
We have all witnessed the cycle from the radicalism of the Vietnam
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War years to the conservativism of the last several years, and the
current extreme distress in the face of a decimated job market.
My inclination is to discount these fluctuations, though of
course not to ignore them, and to assume that the students want to
be properly educated to practice law. The students' problems are,
however, that they know little about the practice of law, and less
about proper education for the practice. In this respect, the
students at elite schools may be much more confused than students
in state university law schools. On the one hand, they envision an
enormously wide variety of practice options, running from legal aid
for the Navahoes to being conseil juridique in Paris. On the other
hand, something like eighty-five percent of these students actually
locate in five major metropolitan areas, primarily in large or
middle-sized private firms practicing corporate law. A large part of
the developmental process for most students in an elite school
therefore consists of dropping hypothetical possibilities in favor of a
reality which some of them regret but which others envy, an envy
that further compounds their confusion. In contrast, most of the
students at a public university law school such as North Dakota,
from the inception of their education, have a pretty clear idea of the
kind of practice they expect to enter.
But that does not mean that students in any law school have
any idea what their curriculum should be. I remember a student at
the University of Chicago who was preparing herself for poverty
law but discovered, fortunately before she finished, that the most
important course from a practical viewpoint was property law for reasons that reflection may suggest. And we all know the
discrepancies in our own professional careers between our law
school prognostications and our careers as they have actually
turned out. For example, I thought I would aim for general practice
in southern Connecticut. As things developed, all I got right was
the location.
The law school student body is uninformed and transitory,
and also generally young. That describes an easily exploited
clientele. When in the time of student protest the law students were
protesting the law school curriculum, we told them they did not
know what they were talking about. With many reservations I
believed at the time that there was truth in that proposition, and
with still more reservations believe that there is also truth in it
today. But that makes the problem more complicated rather than
less. If the students do not know exactly what the law school
program ought to be, and neither do the bar nor the legislature,
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who then is responsible for the curriculum? The answer is not far to
seek.
E.

THE FACULTY

The blunt fact is that a law school faculty largely determines
the education that the school provides. As I have already
established, the faculty does not have sole control of the situation. It
operates only within the constraints imposed by the constituencies
already mentioned. Hence, the faculty of a public university law
school cannot pursue any program that the public, the legislature,
the bar, and the students will not tolerate. Yet those constraints are
relatively weak, and those degrees of tolerance are relatively large.
Certainly the constraints on faculty initiative are far less limiting in
a state university law school than they are in most privately
financed law schools, that is, any private law school that does not
have a substantial endowment. Relative to the average private
school, the average state university law school is indeed very well
funded.
Before making any critical suggestions about law school
faculties, let me take note of the manifold transformations that have
taken place in legal education in the last two decades. Twenty
years ago, clinical education was improvisory; now training in
dealing with clients and dealing with officials is part of the
education of most law students. Twenty years ago, most courses at
law school were taught in one of three formats - the Socratic
dialectic, the discursive lecture, and the discussion seminar. Today
most schools have variations in teaching methods running from
computer-based exercises to independent legal research. Twenty
years ago, the relationships between law and the social sciences
centered on mostly descriptive absorption of sociology. Today the
relationships range across other social sciences, particularly
economics and politics, and are increasingly analytic in their
method.
Indeed, such is the present richness of possibility that the task
of selecting elements of a curriculum has become baffling to a
degree perhaps not appreciated by outsiders in the bar and the
legislature. Consider, however, how many alternatives there would
be if we considered only three variables - subject matter, the
clinical component, and the social science component. We could
take all the subjects in the traditional curriculum, multiply each by
the number of feasible clinical formats, and then multiply each of
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the resultant variations by the number of social science possibilities
that could be imagined. For example, we could study corporation
law by clinical simulation of standard corporate transactions, and
then analyze the transactions in terms of their financial,
managerial and distributive justice implications, resulting in a
course entirely different from the traditional coursebook treatment
of corporation law.
The central problem in the design of the modern law school
curriculum, therefore, is not what to include but what to leave out.
These choices are inherently problematic, for once we cut loose
from the traditional curriculum and traditional teaching methods,
there are no established criteria for choice. But choice has to be
made, for otherwise the law school curriculum will be ten years
4
long, as Dean Prosser warned many years ago.
The critical choices will have to be made by the law faculties.
One might never know this from listening to legal academics. They
curse the bar and the legislature, bemoan the funding sources, and
commiserate with the students. Yet the fact is that a law school
faculty holds most of the cards. No one is going to shut down the
law school. No one is going to fire its faculty. No one is even going
to interfere very long in its faculty recruitment or tenure decisions,
else the AALS, the AAUP, and the ABA will descend with
condemnation and even blacklisting.
The faculty has all the powers of an entrenched bureaucracy.
Only the faculty has continuity in the enterprise, indeed tenured
continuity. The members of the faculty have the best vantage point
to see what is going on over time, although of course many of them
do not look very carefully. The members of the faculty can, if they
will, communicate with all the other constituencies, portraying the
situation in whatever light is advantageous and collecting field
intelligence. They have friends in outside academia and other high
places. Some of them practice law on a consulting basis, thus
tapping into other networks and maintaining other options for
themselves. And, finally, they are supposed to know what a law
school program is supposed to be.
IV. CONCLUSION
What, then, should we conclude is the primary source of
inertia in legal education, in the discrepancy between what most
4. See Prosser, The Ten Year Curriculum, 6J. LEGAL EDUC. 149 (1953-1954).
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everyone agrees ought to be done and what actually is done in legal
education? Not the public, for they are mostly bystanders. Not the
funding sources, for they mostly pay on faith. Not the bar, for their
councils are divided and their means not very effectual. Not the
students, for they come and go.
I am afraid we must look among the law school faculty, here
and everywhere else, and acknowledge, as Pogo said, "We have
met the enemy, and he is us."
Now, who will volunteer to serve on the curriculum
committee?

